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A Response to Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?
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Abstract
In this response to Martin’s “Should Deliberate Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?” I examine 
Martin’s comments against the “argument from circumspection,” which is dubious regarding the 
claims children make to change democratic policies and procedures. I explain there are good reasons 
for being circumspect. One of these concerns the need for all in public discourse to supply not just 
claims but reasons and to have both these claims and reasons adjudicated in the logical space of rea-
sons. Children, as with all who practice public discourse, must have their claims and reasons assessed 
for these to be admitted as candidates for changing policies and procedures. This augurs for a case- by- 
case inclusion of children, as opposed to a wholesale one.
This article is in response to
Martin, C. (2018). Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children? Democracy and 
Education, 26(2), Article 4.
Available at: https:// democracyeducationjournal .org/ home/ vol26/ iss2/ 4
Introduction
In “Should Deliberative Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?” Martin (2018) claimed philosophical interest in the ways in which children may be justifiably excluded 
from voting. Martin noted two (philosophical) problems in the act 
of justifiable exclusion. The first is the generalization problem: argu-
ments that draw on the lack of knowledge could be applied as well 
to adults (p. 1). The second is the circumspection problem: undue 
caution with which we assign weight to the preferences of children 
informing political decisions (p. 2). Overcoming these problems in 
accounts of deliberative democracy involves and invokes the 
epistemic features of these, and Martin spent a good deal of time 
demonstrating the epistemic conditions in and under which such 
accounts must operate.
Martin (2018) quickly moved from the failure of justification 
of certain quasi- developmental accounts of political theory 
regarding the child to solve generalization and circumspection 
problems, to self- consciously deliberative accounts. In the former 
case, Martin gave examples of Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and 
Lawrence Kohlberg (Martin, 2018, p. 5). In these latter, what 
counts as epistemic principle, epistemic inclusion, and epistemic 
reason took center stage (Martin, 2018, pp. 8– 9). Sorting this 
terminology out is a chief feature of this section of his essay. 
Martin claimed epistemic principle as the principle of propor-
tionality of inclusion of preferences of those affected in the 
decision- making procedure (Martin, 2018, p. 8) and the “epis-
temic principle of children’s political inclusion” as that principle 
of epistemic value of children’s preferences to that of any other 
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constituency (Martin, 2018, p. 8).1 With these terms defined, 
Martin began to assemble an argument for overcoming the 
problems of generalization and especially circumspection.
In the next section, Martin (2018) canvassed the political 
literature in an attempt to overcome these problems; he looked at 
deliberative democratic arguments from the distinctness of 
children (pp. 11– 12), public understanding (pp. 12– 13), and 
nondenomination (pp. 14– 15). It turns out none of these adequately 
capture the nature of the problems, nor do they solve them; indeed, 
the problem of circumspection in particular, pointed up by the 
asymmetry of adult versus children’s deliberative preferences, 
proves to be a valuable reminder for deliberative democrats that we 
must have children’s long- term interests in mind when responding 
to their preferences. Martin followed James Bohlman’s work on 
asymmetry in this regard. Martin’s thesis at the end of the section is 
that children should be granted epistemic inclusion and their 
preferences should be treated as independent sources and claims of 
what is fair and just (p. 16).
Martin (2018) then turned his attention to the aims of 
schooling (p. 16). Martin drew on Miranda Fricker’s work regard-
ing epistemic injustices and minorities, injustices of testimony, and 
interpretation (credibility and understanding) in the contestation 
of the citizen (p. 17).2 Circumspection, which Martin cautiously 
endorsed, must be shown to avoid the epistemic injustice of 
discrimination against preferences simply because the preferences 
are from children (p. 18). We must take children’s preferences 
seriously if we are to educate in deliberative, democratic schools, 
and taking children’s preferences seriously thereby becomes an aim 
of the school (p. 19). Martin thought the problem of circumspec-
tion, which turns out to be a problem of reach (too much versus too 
little) is ameliorated when schools take children seriously as 
epistemic members of the community (p. 19).
Part One: The Role of the Epistemic
Here I want to delve more deeply into Martin’s (2018) various uses 
of epistemic, with the intention of developing a coherent and 
comprehensive understanding of the term. This will be important 
in what follows, for Martin’s use and understanding of epistemic 
does a great deal of the heavy lifting in turning the circumspection 
problem to an advantage, and to the overall plausibility of the 
deliberative, democratic approach to schools. To be clear, I am 
discussing epistemic in regards Martin’s position from democratic 
1 I think this sets Martin up to overemphasize the consequential-
ist evaluation of claims, to the detriment of the inferential (logical) 
evaluations. Indeed, it seems there is little role for fitting claims, and 
the reasons behind those claims, in something like ‘the logical space of 
reasons,’ to be adjudicated there for fit.
2 In a view of epistemic inclusion that ignores the inferential lattice-
work that constitutes the logical space of reasons making up public dis-
course. She has made consequential arguments (arguments for changes 
in the practical discourse) primary and inferential licensing (assessment 
of claims for their suitability as reasons in public discourse) secondary. 
Indeed, inferential gatekeeping seems dependent on consequentialist ar-
guments in Fricker’s handling of the two. I reverse the order. My reasons 
for this are laid out in part two.
deliberation and the broader emphasis on justice as fairness that 
this implies and not attempting to articulate a robust philosophical 
account of justification. I pick up Martin’s argument for “epistemic 
inclusion” beginning on pages 7– 8 of the article. Epistemic 
justification in the context of deliberative democratic theory has to 
do with the giving and taking of reasons “as a means to public 
agreement” (p. 4). Martin followed Amy Gutmann and Jürgen 
Habermas here. Democratic deliberation “enhances epistemic 
quality of political decisions made in the interests of justice and 
fairness” (p. 4). From this, an “epistemic principle of political 
inclusion” (p. 5) can be generated. This is, “the likelihood that a 
political decision is successful increases as we include the perspec-
tives of those affected in the decision- making procedure” (p. 5). 
Furthermore, an “epistemic principle of political inclusion” can be 
directed to children: “The epistemic principle of children’s political 
inclusion: the inclusion of children is an epistemically valuable as 
the inclusion of any other constituency affected by a political 
decision” (p. 5). The willingness of an individual or group affected 
by a decision is more likely to make an “epistemic contribution” if 
they are included in deliberation than otherwise (p. 8). Indeed, this 
is the practical point of deliberative, democratic theory. Martin 
called this the “contribution premise” (pp. 8– 9).
But this invokes a legitimate reaction. Martin (2018) contin-
ued: that “everyone’s participation is epistemically helpful is simply 
an overstatement, because we know from experience that some 
people in fact do not make relevant contributions to deliberation” 
(p. 9). He claimed:
The development of the best available argument is what deliberation is 
about, on an epistemic view, and this requires claims to be assessed for 
their merits. But even then, arguments found to be wanting are still 
epistemically valuable. For example, unconvincing but well- crafted 
and well- intended arguments can shape our collective knowledge and 
understanding of a political norm or decision by refining our sense  
of what is justifiable and what is not, or be sensitizing us to points of 
view we had not considered fully beforehand. These “failed” 
arguments can serve as bridges to more successful ones. (p. 5)
We are beginning to get an understanding of the role that “epis-
temic” plays in “epistemic inclusion.” It is not enough for agents to 
put forward their preferences in the public space; these preferences 
must be cast in such a way that they can be agreed upon. The space 
of agreement is equally the space of deliberation; that is to say, it is 
the space of public justification. And what is put forward in the 
space of public justification are the individual’s preferences but not 
for immediate consumption and resultant social change, rather, for 
deliberation. Still, it turns out that even poorly argued or ill- fitting 
preferences are granted at least some significance in terms of their 
overall capacity to shape the public deliberation.
Therefore, we can justify an epistemic principle of inclusion supported 
by the contribution premise without denying that deliberative ability 
varies across individuals and groups. All that variability tells us is that 
once included, some arguments will be articulated with more skill by 
some than others. But all such arguments are more likely to make a 
contribution if they are included than excluded. (p. 5)
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Martin moved with facility from the “contribution premise,” 
whereby an individual or group is more likely to participate in a 
deliberative public, given the opportunity, to the conclusion that 
the individual or group ought to participate regardless of the 
particular preference (and the personal justification with which it 
is accompanied) and that this particular preference is more likely 
to make a contribution.
Let us see what “epistemic inclusion” consists of thus far. It 
includes democratic deliberation, taking place in a public field or 
sphere, in which agents (individuals or groups) present their 
preferences, ostensibly couched in the form of reasons (inclusive of 
personal justifications); these preferences are freely proposed 
(under no coercion), with no presumptive obstructions or hurdles 
on the part of the public, many of which may not ultimately 
influence public deliberation yet are likely to encourage ongoing 
participation and make a contribution to democracy. Martin 
(2018) endorsed the force of this understanding, because:
epistemic inclusion means that we must accord presumptive epistemic 
value to the reasons that our fellow citizens offer in practical 
discourse, giving them time and opportunity to test those reasons 
against other arguments and points of view. To do otherwise would  
be an act of exclusion, and an epistemically bad act at that. But what 
about children? (p. 10).
Martin claimed we ought to extend this notion of “epistemic 
inclusion” to children, and in so doing, make children valuable 
participants in deliberative democratic theory and practices.
Martin (2018) then brought this set of claims back to the 
“argument from circumspection.” We have seen that this argument 
posits adults as in the best position to make epistemic claims on 
children’s knowledge: children, unlike adults, are said “to be known 
to not know” and therefore cannot be made participants in 
deliberative democratic theory and practices. Martin, of course, 
refused this claim (p. 10). It turns out that children are more likely 
to participate in future deliberation if given the opportunity to do 
so when young and therefore ought to participate when young. So 
much for the argument from circumspection. With the way 
forward, Martin was able to turn to the schools and the practical 
upshot of the “epistemic inclusion” of children.
Martin’s (2018) argument has intuitive appeal. It obviously makes 
sense that children (and indeed, all of those who would participate in a 
deliberative democratic process) align their pre sent participation 
with future participation and that present participation is encour-
agement for ongoing presence in the public sphere. It seems to me 
this is a consequentialist claim, and to the degree that it is eviden-
tially sound (that research backs it up), it should go forward. 
However, there is slippage in Martin’s argument that I foresee as 
masking a larger, philosophical chasm between consequentialists 
(who will like the argument as it stands) and others, who will 
(rightly, I think) question the role that the “ought” is doing in 
moving us from children expressing their preferences to the 
acceptance of these preferences as adjusting the shared deliberative 
world of public discourse. The matter comes down to this: Even 
admitting that there are good consequentialist arguments for 
children participating in deliberative democratic discourses, ought 
we to take their preferences, and the reasons they give for them, 
seriously? I think we must be careful here and not accept them 
holus- bolus: I think we must take them one by one. Thus, I am not 
willing to give up the claim that we should be cautious of children’s 
preferences unless and until it be shown that children’s preferences 
and the reasons behind them are publically defendable, epistemi-
cally justifiable, and socially cogent. And, contrary to Martin’s 
dismissal of the argument (p. 10), I don’t think he wants to give this 
up either. To show that this is the case, in part two, I take my 
departure from the “argument from circumspection,” as Martin 
characterized it, briefly turn to Martin’s earlier writing on the 
topics of discourse morality and dialogicality, and then return to 
the linguistic- inferential and dialogical context invoked in 
allowing children to modify the deliberative, democratic public 
discourse.
Part Two: Discourse Morality, Epistemic Justification, and the 
Inclusion of Children
In nontranscendental accountings of morality, what makes 
morality of a public nature moral is its susceptibility of discursive 
justification. Martin here and elsewhere has ruled out transcenden-
tal justifications of public morality (Martin, 2012, p. 89; 2018, p. 3): 
he is therefore left with justification in and through public dis-
course (Martin, 2012, p. 92). This discourse is epistemic insofar as:
As an individual, I cannot decide on behalf of others that all could 
agree to my proposed action or policy; rather, I claim that a proposed 
norm or policy could be agreed to and defended as such in rational 
public discourse. This is the epistemic meaning of my claim. (Martin, 
2012, p. 92)
When we put forward our preferences, we put forward a claim that 
is suitable for both agreement and defense in public 
deliberation— the claim may in fact be far from epistemic suitabil-
ity; nevertheless, we, as members of a public discourse, are entitled 
to put claims forward that we think are suitable for acceptance.  
We acknowledge the truth of our claim in moving it forward,  
and we are aware of the need for the acknowledgment of others in 
so doing. Others are aware that we are aware, and we are aware that 
others are aware. This is the basis of the social recognition inherent 
in discourse communities theorized from Hegel to the present. It is 
this awareness that must be developed by children to participate 
fully in discourse communities.3
The rational public discourse Martin (2012) spoke of in 
Education in a Post- Metaphysical World is the logical space of 
(discursive) reasons. In the Habermasian, Sellarsian, and  
Brandomian senses of this domain, reasons are claims given and 
taken, and justification is broadly dependent on a stock of prior 
reasons built up of previous discourse yet available to us as a 
3 While Martin rejected quasi- developmental accounts of children as 
having insufficient learning to participate in discursive communities, 
he did not, I think, reject the solidity of the claims of social recognition, 
together with its long historical provenance. Much practice takes place in 
mastering a language, and this involves recognition of being recognized 
and recognizing others in turn.
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quasi- intuitive context of discursive operations. When we put our 
claims forward, we recognize that they are claims, that they are up 
for debate and dialogue, even as we strongly support their cogency 
and coherency (our belief about them). Thus, in entering into a 
dialogue with claims, we anticipate their cogency and their 
capacity as reasons in a deliberative, justificatory process. In other 
words, when we enter into a dialogue with claims, we already do so 
in full view of their operation as reasons. Regardless of whether or 
not further inferential claims accompany our claims and assertions 
(consider “it is hotter in this spot” versus “it is hotter in this spot 
because the sun is directly over me”), as taken up in public dis-
course, they are understood to be accompanied by, and susceptible 
of, further reasons.
Those who wish to enter into public discourse and dialogue 
do so through putting claims forward. This includes every partici-
pant, young and old, having strong or diminished faculties, lucid or 
otherwise. To put forward a claim is to either supply, or be on  
the hook for, reasons as to why the claim should be accepted. The 
“argument from circumspection” is not only suspicious of those 
who are very young, have diminished faculties, or are other than 
lucid, it pronounces a negative verdict on the claims of these not 
having heard the reasons behind them. This is a species of prejudice, 
for it licenses dismissal of claims regardless of whether cogent 
reasons are supplied or not.4 Applied to children, the “argument 
from circumspection,” at least in this strong form, is prejudicial 
and antithetical to deliberative discourse as a means to proper 
justification.
However, there is a weaker sense of the “argument from 
circumspection” that might be more cogent and, in any event, 
stands in the way of the full- scale acceptance of children’s claims  
to be taken seriously in public deliberation. We have said that 
claims put forward in public discourse are to be accompanied by, 
or at least susceptible of, further reasons. I take it this applies 
equally to all who put claims forward, including those who are very 
young, have diminished faculties, or are other than lucid. Putting a 
claim forward demands attention and recognition of the act of 
claim- staking. It demands asking over and assessing reasons. This 
is a public activity, in which reasons are deliberated upon along 
with the claim. But of course, it also depends upon context and 
circumstances, that vast repertory of inferences that is swung into 
operation in assessing claims. These inferences serve to justify the 
cogency of the present claim, and if the present claim cannot be 
justified by and through these inferences, the claim fails as 
normative prerogative (Martin, 2018, p. 25).5 Justification is a 
quasi- intuitive operation, in which the new claim is brought up 
against already- existing linguistic- inferential discursive practices; 
4 For Kant, prejudice “is the mechanism of reason in principles” and is 
“a principium for judging based on subjective causes that are regarded as 
objective” (Kant 1781/1992, p. 314). Moving from prejudice to objective 
judging involves practice in giving (objective) reasons for one’s claims 
and assertions; dismissal of claims without having heard the reasons 
behind them is tantamount to judging based on subjective causes.
5 In Martin’s estimation, the account I am putting forward would count 
as a “constructivist epistemic conception,” following Martin (2006).
it is a licensing, in which the claim is assessed as to its inferential 
coherence, its hanging- together logically with other existing 
reasons and admitted or rejected on this basis. Beyond this, a more 
pragmatic evaluation of the claim’s consequences for both linguis-
tic and behavioral (including political and policy) practices can be 
ascertained.
Martin’s (2018) conclusion with respect to “epistemic inclu-
sion” was that “we must accord presumptive epistemic value to  
the reasons that our fellow citizens offer in practical discourse” 
(p. 5, italics mine). I heartily concur. But this means distinguishing 
the claims our fellow citizens offer from the reasons they proffer in 
making those claims. Doubtless, the claim and the reasons for the 
claim are conjoined. But we must pull them apart enough to see 
how well they operate together. It is not enough to simply put 
forward the claims of citizens, adult or child. We must also ask over 
and ascertain the reasons they put these claims forth. We do this by 
subjecting individual claims to the network of inferentially 
licensed reasons. On this reading, some claims will be intuitively 
indefensible. Consider the case of open bigotry. The dismissal of 
someone’s opinion on the basis of their skin color (e.g., “I don’t 
believe her because she’s Black”) will be thought of as indefensible 
because no cogent inferentially licensed reason will be available to 
support it, and this from the get- go. And this is not because the 
initial claims are taken up in public deliberation and painstak-
ingly assessed by various stakeholders in discourse; rather, it is 
quasi- intuitively false, largely owing to a history of debates on the 
matter in which strong reasons have been put forward. Merely 
bringing this claim forth as a reason is already to have violated the 
“epistemic inclusion” clause.
Martin (2018) insisted that schools have an obligation to 
develop and foster an environment where children can become 
deliberative agents through educational opportunities for demo-
cratic deliberation (p. 18). Following Fricker, Martin distinguished 
epistemic justice from “formative epistemic injustice,” a condition 
that takes root when children’s competence to develop the means 
to “successfully contest norms and policies within deliberation” 
(p. 9). Examples Martin gave include unwillingness to help 
children in developing this competence, treating their claims as 
mere information, and taking condescending attitudes toward 
their claims (p. 18). But I suggest that we disentangle the claims 
children put forth from the reasons for them doing so. We do this 
by subjecting their claims to inferentially licensed reasons. It will 
turn out that at least some of the reasons children give do not meet 
the requirements of this inferential licensing and should be 
rejected as quasi- intuitively false. This does not, pace Fricker, 
violate epistemic justice. And it does not because it denies that 
justice resides in acceptance of children’s claims; rather, justice lies 
in their licensing through existing inferences. This does not 
conflict with Martin’s broader claim that schools are responsible to 
develop and foster the environment where children can become 
deliberative agents; rather, it shifts the locus of what counts as 
licensed deliberative outcomes from claims to reasons.
An empirical survey of children’s claims regarding success in 
justification and consequences in respect of political changes 
suited to their demands has never, to my mind, been conducted. 
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Nevertheless, if it were, I worry a good percentage of the claims put 
forward would be intuitively unsupportable and immediately in 
violation of the “epistemic inclusion” clause. It cannot be the case 
that a mere claim, put forward, is entitled to obvious and immedi-
ate entrance into the logical space of reasons. It cannot be the case 
until it has been quasi- intuitively assessed as to its cogency and 
coherence with existing reasons, and this means the reasons for its 
being put forth must be evaluated. This is not to denigrate the 
claims or reasons children give; such scepticism cannot be 
warranted on a philosophical accounting alone, as it would require 
an empirical survey. It is rather a reminder that when claims are 
put forward, they are quasi- intuitively justified through recourse to 
a logical- discursive- inferential network formed of reasons given in 
previous (social) public deliberations. Not only claims but reasons 
for those claims are susceptible of evaluation and asking for 
reasons when claims are put forth is central to the practice of 
justification.
However, it may be objected that setting up the logical space 
of reasons this way is to transform it into a gauntlet through which 
claims must successfully pass if they are to be accorded the 
standing of justification: this would serve to inhibit the ethical 
force of these claims, by constraining the subjective, emotional 
conditions from which these claims were generated, and in many 
cases, bring with them. On this reading, the space of reasons, as the 
epistemic, inferentially licensed set of reasons that controls 
justification of claims in public discourse, makes no room for, and 
conveys no validity to, arguments from subjectivity, including 
emotion. Yet such a conclusion would be premature. Such justifica-
tion does not deny or even limit the putting forth of claims to those 
claims and accompanying reasons that are nonsubjective (i.e., 
assessable by all); it only limits the justification of those claims to 
those that are objectively assessable. Only if a subjective claim is 
put forward with subjective reason(s) (operating as a ground) as its 
basis is the claim rejected as inadmissible. A claim with emotional 
content or subjective reasons can be put forward; however, the 
objective content (legitimate inferentially licensed reasons) of the 
claim alone will be assessed for validity. It is an old argument, still 
valid, running from Kant to Habermas and beyond, that private, 
subjective claims (arguments to emotion and to private circum-
stances) cannot by themselves be the material for objective, public 
assessment; claims must be publically available (objective) for 
them to be assessed as justifiable in light of public interests. An 
attitude of circumspection must prevail. Just what the inferences 
contain that makes them suitable for the act of justifying claims is a 
matter beyond the scope of this paper, though it is a source of great 
concern.6
6 I follow broadly Kant, Sellars, Habermas, and Brandom in specifying 
the public nature of all claims put forward for assessment in discursive 
practices. I fully recognize the variability of foundations for such a  
Notice that the circumspection of inferential licensing of 
claims put forth is not the only licensing that takes place. Provided 
inferential licensing to ensure the public availability of claims has 
taken place, there is then the matter of consequential licensing. 
Once the claim is fit for public discourse, the consequences of the 
claim, inclusive of the reasons the claim is put forward, are up for 
adjudication. These consequences form the standard anticipatory 
effects of the practical implementation of the claim. But it is 
important that consequential analysis follows, not precedes, 
inferential licensing. If the claim and the reasons put forward for 
the claim cannot be shown to be publically available (cannot be 
shown to fit in the logical space of reasons), then the claim does not 
proceed.
Epistemic inclusion of children, therefore, must include the 
reasons for claims put forward if these reasons are to be taken 
seriously, together with their accompanying assertions influencing 
public dialogue, debate, and practices. This means that children’s 
claims should be taken seriously but only when accompanied by 
reasons and only if those reasons jibe with the quasi- intuitive 
framework of inferences that forms the web of logical reasons in 
linguistic, dialogic, public practices. Only then can the conse-
quences of the claims, should they be brought forward and made 
operational, be ascertained. The call to be circumspect makes sense 
only if it references this web of inferences, itself composed of 
reasons. But bearing this in mind, circumspection is a healthy 
disposition and, I might add, a good idea for dealing not just with 
children but all linguistic and social actors. In this regard, I believe 
Martin (2018) would concur.
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